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BY:  
 
NEIL MALANI 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A vast literature acknowledges the corruptibility of regulators; however, empirical tests on the 
matter have been limited to two-agent models examining the rulemaking process and price 
regulation of natural monopolies. It remains an open question whether political contributions, by 
driving legislative pressure, can entice laxity from regulators in their application of the rules. To 
remedy this issue, I observe the highly-regulated coal mining industry for which there exists 
several points for inspector discretion. By comparing the outcomes with Congressional coal 
mining contribution levels, I am able to ascertain capture across several dimensions. Specifically, 
I find that contributions are associated with agency inspectors using their discretion to preempt 
violations requiring follow-up inspection, grant more inspections to waive safety requirements, 
conduct shorter inspections, and grant lower penalties. It is troubling that these findings occur at 
relatively low levels of contributions, suggesting a high level of corruptibility on the part of 
regulators. 
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 Ronald Reagan once quipped, “It's been said that politics is the second oldest profession. 
I have learned that it bears a striking resemblance to the first.” Indeed, the conception of the 
corrupt politician selling preferential treatment and favors for campaign contributions has been 
recognizable, albeit declining, for more than a century. In particular, the narrative that the flood 
of contributions by businesses (and their millionaire owners) is leading to the corporate takeover 
of American politics has been “repeated so constantly and with such vehemence that it has 
become for millions of Americans an article of faith” (Wilkinson 2012). These concerns have 
only been amplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission (558 U.S. 310), in which the Court, striking down prohibitions on independent 
corporate expenditures, held that while independent expenditures by corporations might result in 
“influence over or access to elected officials,” they “do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”  
As early as 1934, with the creation of the American Liberty League, businessmen have 
been working to ameliorate their concern that “business, which bears the responsibility for the 
paychecks of private employment, has little voice in government.” Those early efforts collapsed 
(the League was disbanded in 1940); however, the role and amount of corporate expenditures in 
politics has only grown since then. Nevertheless, the full extent of what this money purchases is 
still unclear. Indeed, if any market sector ought to know how best to spend, it ought to be the one 
responsible for making and executing trades: the financial services industry. Nevertheless, in the 
past election Wall Street donations to the losing candidate accumulated un-hedged. Center for 
Responsible Politics data reveals that Governor Mitt Romney’s top 5 contributors were all major 
banks: Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Credit 
Suisse Group (Phillips 2012). More than 82% of individual donations from the hedge fund and 
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private equity industries went to Governor Romney.  
Excluding this anecdotal evidence, there is very little evidence to suggest that corporate 
political expenditures have a significant impact on the outcome of legislative decisions. Burstein 
(2003) review the literature on public opinion and public policy, and find that the former was key 
driver of the latter: “[p]ublic opinion affects policy three-quarters of the times its impact is 
gauged; its effect is of substantial policy importance at least a third of the time, and probably a 
fair amount more.” Surveying almost 40 studies with various specifications examining the 
outcome of various roll call votes, Ansolabehere, et al. (2003) find that “campaign contributions 
had no statistically significant effects on legislation or had the ‘wrong’ sign.” To the extent that 
evidence exists suggesting a rational purpose for contributions, it is limited to work by Stratmann 
(1991), amongst others, who models contributions as spending on electoral outcomes (i.e. 
contributions help elect like-mined representatives).  
On this analysis alone, it makes little sense for corporations to contribute to political 
campaigns. Of course this ignores one key limitation of the above analysis – legislative votes are 
not the only decisions made by either legislators or the federal government writ large. Indeed, 
legislators are also responsible for mandating, budgeting, and overseeing various federal 
agencies. Research on the role of expenditures in purchasing preferable treatment from these 
executive and independent agencies, however, has been limited. There is certainly evidence to 
suggest that regulators are not incorruptible – there exists a broad literature on regulatory 
capture, which has been discussed extensively since the 1960s. Initially, the term was only used 
in a narrow sense, specifically to refer to the mechanisms by which regulated monopolies exert 
control over state bodies that are supposed to be controlling the firm. Dal Bó (2006) provides a 
definition more aligned with present day usage: “the process through which special interests 
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affect state intervention in any of its forms, which can include areas as diverse as the setting of 
monetary policy, or legislation affecting R&D.” The specific nature of this process has not, 
however, been discussed extensively. If contributions do, in fact, drive capture, then there exists 
a rationale beyond the mere “appearance of corruption” for restricting corporate political 
expenditures. For good governance groups to craft effective legislation combating the perceived 
problem, it then becomes critical to identify (a) if contributions impact outcomes and (b) if so, by 
what mechanism are those favors pressed into place.  
 In this paper, I decline to tackle the second as it is largely unobservable – few if any 
Congressmen are tactless enough directly order agencies to be lenient on contributors (the 
Keating Five Scandal provides an interesting counterpoint). Further and more importantly, it is 
difficult to systematically observe all orders, conversation, and other methods of influence 
required to test hypotheses regarding the mechanism. Using data set comprised of Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA) inspections, I address the first question by examining 
whether contributions are systematically related to regulatory leniency. Isolating mine and 
inspection geography, I am able to examine the association between contributions, and 
inspection frequency and outcomes. I find limited evidence to support the proposition that 
contributions change the pattern of inspections and more conclusive evidence to support the 
proposition that contributions are responsible for lower quality inspections. 
I. Background 
 Well before the economic literature began to develop a theory of capture, political 
scientists had begun observing factors that could cause policymakers to act in a non-benevolent 
manner. Rejecting the then common benevolent-planner approach, Gaus (1947) situates 
policymakers within an ecological system. Gaus asserts and illustrates the effect of various 
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factors (people, place, physical technology, social technology, wishes and ideas, catastrophe, and 
personality) on administrative decision making. Examining physical technology, Gaus finds 
suboptimal policy to be the result of jockeying between “automobile users, hotel proprietors, 
road builders” and “carriage and harness makers,” resulting in bureaucratic infighting over 
taxation and jurisdiction. 
 Long (1949) then identifies the exact linkage by which competition between interests 
highlighted a rational reason for agencies to deviate from their established purpose: power. 
Central to this claim is the assertion that “[t]he lifeblood of administration is power,” leading to 
the necessary corollary that administrative bodies are primarily concerned with “[i]ts attainment, 
maintenance, increase, dissipation, and loss.” He considers the hypothetical counterfactual 
comparing two agencies, both created by identical statutes. The difference being that the first 
was “wrung from an amorphous and unstable combination of consumer and labor groups,” while 
the second was “backed by the disciplined organizations of farmers and their Congressmen.” 
Even though, they would have the same “legal authority to act,” the latter would be far more 
successful, as it would have power (specifically the power that comes from “public legitimacy”). 
In other words, benevolent agencies, in their quest to carry out their mission, must keep an eye to 
maximizing their power. 
 Stigler (1971) is the first to suggest an economic theory of capture. His fundamental 
hypothesis is that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit.” The level will be determined by the intersection of the (industry) 
demand curve for regulation and the (politician's) supply of regulation. He asserts that two 
fundamental characteristics of the special interest would determine its demand. First, he asserts 
that larger groups would have more difficulty acquiring regulation. The larger group size creates 
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a collective-action problem: in larger groups, each member's contribution to the collective 
lobbying effort, matter less. Hence, the temptation in larger groups is for an individual 
beneficiary to evade their individual contribution. This could be offset by the stakes for 
beneficiaries – large stakes incentivizes action by members. On the supply side, he starts with the 
proposition that regulation is supplied by politicians seeking to maximize their power, which is 
dependent on money and votes. Money from special interests would motivate politicians to 
supply regulation, while those on the losing end of the proposed regulation would cost the 
politician votes. He, however, discounts this factor by arguing that most voters would be only 
marginally affected by the new regulation, and would therefore have little incentive to consider 
the regulation in their voting decisions.  
 Peltzman (1976) advances upon this theory by finding competition between interests 
implied that no single interest could capture a regulatory body. For Peltzman, a politician's goal 
is to maximize their majority (determined by money and votes), which cannot occur when a 
politician offers complete producer protection – insofar as consumers possess the ability to offer 
a few votes or a small monetary contribution, the majority maximizing politician will depart 
from the cartel equilibrium. Due to organization and information costs, it is unlikely that a small 
deviation would result in complete withdrawal of producer support in the event of a deviation 
from complete producer protection. On the other hand, Peltzman's consumers are stronger than 
Stigler's as he accurately recognizes that subgroups of consumers can organize to provide the 
appropriate political benefit for consumer protection. In effect, the regulator will choose the 
bundle of rents that best maximizing his or her majority given the differing payoffs that the 
various interested parties are able to offer, resulting in an optimal bundle entailing neither 
complete consumer, nor complete producer protection.  
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 Becker (1983) provides a subsequent major advancement to the model: deadweight losses 
as a constraint on inefficient regulatory policies. Using a model similar to Peltzman (two 
competing interests vying for a regulator's favor), he introduces deadweight losses (technically, 
the difference between the heights of the supply and demand function, but functionally 
equivalent to the winner's gain minus the loser's loss from the regulatory change). The further the 
regulator moves from the optimum, the smaller the marginal gain for the winner, and the larger 
the marginal loss for the loser. The extra effect of a dollar's gain (in allowing the winner to 
influence the politician) creates increasing pressure from the losers to escape the escalating 
losses. Hence, an equilibrium can have some deadweight loss (i.e., some capture), but it will be 
bounded. 
 Additional literature focuses on complicating the model. The first subset of this literature 
works to introduce the additional actors, as well as private information to capture theory. Tirole 
(1986) separates the government from the regulator, leaving three actors: the government, the 
regulator and the firm. Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs (i.e., private information), 
leaves the regulator to propose a contract that attempts to limit the benefits to the monopoly, but 
one that will leave rents in cases where costs are lower than what regulators believe them to be. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) then use the separation between the government and regulators to 
propose a model that would provide regulators with an incentive to be captured. Taking Tirole's 
model, they note that, often, due to the expertise of the regulator, they are able to overcome the 
information asymmetry to find out the true costs of the firm. If this happens, regulators ought to 
tell the government the true cost, such that they can write a contract that efficiently regulates the 
monopoly. The incentive for firms is then to bribe the regulator into feigning ignorance of the 
firms' true costs, leading them to provide the government with the previously postulated second-
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best contract, thereby leaving rents for the firms to capture.  
 Separating the government from the regulator also allows for models wherein 
Congressional (oversight) action acts to modulate regulatory activity. Using comparative statics, 
Weingast and Moran (1983) find that Federal Trade Commission behavior from 1964 onwards 
was significantly driven by Congressional behavior (and composition). If composition matters, 
then this suggests that firms spend to secure allies on Congressional Committees. Indeed, Snyder 
(1990) finds evidence that spending in open legislative races is used to purchase favors. Poole, 
Romer, and Rosenthal (1987) find that spending on incumbents may be directed at securing the 
incumbency of legislative allies.  
 Later authors have also introduced additional incentives that might tempt regulators to 
provide firms some protection. Hilton (1972), recognizes that regulators will attempt to prevent 
regulators from "squawking." Firms who are dissatisfied with their regulators might very well 
spread negative rumors or information about the competence of the regulator, thereby damaging 
either the specific regulator or the agency. Leaver (2009) uses a model wherein regulators cannot 
guarantee that their decisions will not unnecessarily hurt firms. In this instance, when the firms 
are hurt by a regulatory mistake, they will squawk, and as regulators are not perfect, the 
complaint could gain traction). If regulators are concerned about their reputations (and believe 
that the squawking could impact it negatively), they will be generous to noisy firms – even if 
they are certain that harsher treatment is in order. Hence, generous policies (even if mistaken) 
will not draw complaints, while tough policies (even if optimal) will draw leniency. Dal Bó, et 
al. (2006) add bribes to this setup, finding that (relative to the counterfactual where firms cannot 
exert coercive pressure, leading to lower payoffs to regulators) the ability to apply coercive 
pressure to regulators will decrease competence.  
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 Finally, there are attempts to introduce further consumer pressure into the model. 
Holburn and Spiller (2002) study the aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s. Specifically, they 
examine the creation of independent consumer advocates as a method to keep consumer interest 
in mind. They find that these consumer advocates help decrease the price of electricity. There is 
mixed evidence suggesting that elected officials are less prone to capture by industry. Hagerman 
and Ratchford (1978) investigate whether the method of regulator selection (e.g., election or 
appointment) makes a difference in allowed margin, and find no evidence that the method of 
appointment influences allowed margins. Boyes and McDowell (1989) find that legislators are 
responsive to consumers, as states that require legislative approval of commission rates have 
lower electricity costs. Besley and Coate (2003) look at pricing (of fossil fuels), rather than 
margins, and find a result to the contrary, namely that elected commissioners do, in fact, protect 
consumers, Fields et al. (1997) examine the insurance market using Proposition 103 (in 
California), which placed approval of property and casualty rates in the hands of an elected 
insurance commission. Using an event study, they find that Proposition 103 did reduce rates – 
although this could have also been due to uncertainty.  
 While models examining an individual regulator provide a basic structural framework, 
they do not adequately reflect the fact that most regulated industries must pressure a body of 
individuals. Denzau and Munger (1986) examine the decision-making process of legislators who 
face rewards (e.g., campaign contributions) from special interests and punishment (e.g., 
withholding of votes) by consumers for selling out. Given the variability in constituencies, 
legislators will have varying prices. The firms will then attempt to assemble a majority of 
minimum-cost legislators. Snyder (1991) proposes a model wherein a firm targets the legislators 
that are neither friendly (already likely to vote for the firm's project) nor unfriendly (too 
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expensive). In other words, firms target legislators that are on the fence. Hence, firms will 
minimize their requests to lower costs. In addition, they will find larger legislatures more 
expensive as they will need to bribe blocks rather than single legislators. Neeman (1999) injects 
uncertainty regarding the value of a vote into the model, finding that votes in large legislatures 
will be cheaper as legislators will attach a smaller probability to their vote being pivotal.  
 Economists and political scientists have both speculated that campaign contributions by 
firms could also have an effect on capture. The empirical evidence on this question is 
unfortunately scarce. De Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) examine the effect of legislative 
campaign contributions on the price that extant firms are allowed to charge (to entrants for use of 
their infrastructure), finding that contributions do raise this price. In the literature on trade, 
Hansen and Park (1995) examine complaints to the international trade administration finding that 
complaints are more likely to be successful when firm Political Action Committees (PACs) 
donate to members on the committees responsible for overseeing trade. Eicher and Osang (2002) 
find more non-tariff protection when PAC contributions to legislators are higher. Gordon and 
Hafer (2005) provide a mechanism by which firm political spending would affect regulatory 
action. Specifically, they examine the idea that spending might be a signaling mechanism (put 
another way, an attempt to flex their muscles at bureaucrats). Examining the number of hours 
spent by regulators at nuclear plants, they find that while large donors (controlling for spending, 
those with high PAC contributions to and on behalf of candidates) are less compliant, they are 
also monitored less. They also find qualified support for the hypothesis that firms with publicly 
observable problems decrease their political expenditures. Gordon and Hafer (2007) find a 
Bayesian equilibrium, wherein firms spend for two reasons: (1) once a mandate is in place, they 
will use the magnitude of their contributions to deter enforcement and (2) the allocation of their 
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contributions to encourage legislatures to weaken the mandate.  
II. Empirical Framework 
The primary goal of this paper is to determine if contributions are (positively) related to 
regulatory capture. Historically, capture has been necessarily difficult to distill into a single 
variable. State-by-state comparisons of the presence of capture necessarily examine rulemaking, 
rather than outcomes. Examinations of pricing are useful for determining the degree of capture, 
but again do not give rise to broader insights on regulatory outcomes. As such this paper 
attempts to examine both the pattern and various outcomes of inspections to determine the 
presence of capture. While not determinative, the specific outcome variable where capture is 
recorded could potentially suggest the mechanism by which capture occurs. To help distill 
capture into a variable, this paper will focus on answering the following research questions:  
(1) Do inspectors use their discretion to reduce random inspections to contributors?  
(2) Do inspectors use their discretion to give out lesser violations to contributors, thereby 
preempting otherwise required inspections associated with higher penalties?  
(3) For inspections of the same character, does the MSHA conduct less thorough 
inspections for contributors?  
(4) Are negative inspection outcomes reduced for contributors?  
(5) Do inspectors use their discretion to preempt higher penalties for contributors by 
lessening penalty determinants?  
(6) Does the MSHA minimize squawking by strong firms through reducing penalties for 
contributor firms that choose to contest their penalty?  
These six research questions have been formulated into empirically testable variables 
through the following models: 
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In the above models, there are the following control variables:  
X is a vector of control variables representing the inherent hazard level of the mine – a 
factor that would likely influence the number of inspections.  
 
Y represents the influence of miners (i.e. if they have a safety committee). This helps 
account for factors that have the potential to offset capture.  
 
Z is a vector of variables representing the difficulty of conducting an inspection, which 
ought to be germane to the length and intensity of any inspection that takes place.  
 
The first model is estimated using mine fixed effects and dummy variables for the cycle are 
excluded. All other models account for cycle specific fixed effects using such dummy variables.  
 The first model measures whether the number of spot inspections (in a given election 
cycle for a given mine) is a function of contributions and having a Republican Congressman with 
control variables for the inherent safety risks of the mine and miner influence. The second model 
measures whether the intensity of an inspection for a mine is a function of contributions and 
having a Republican Congressman, with control variables for difficulty of inspection and miner 
influence. The third model measures whether a given penalty factor is a function of contributions 
and having a Republican Congressman. Given that these models do not present capture as a 
single outcome, but rather the result of a variety of choices by inspectors, for each equation there 
is more than one possible outcome variable. 
The first equation measures the effect of contributions on the pattern of discretionary 
inspections, holding certain factors constant. The first outcome variable examined is spot 
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inspections writ large. Thus, the first outcome measures whether contributions drive inspections 
of all spot types (excluding 103(g) and 103(i)).1 The second outcome variable measured is spot 
inspections. That is, the second outcome measures whether contributions drive general spot 
inspections (those flagged in activity reports as “Spot Inspection”).2 The third outcome variable 
measured is Office Generated Violation Activity. This measures whether contributions decreases 
the issuance of violations that require follow-up inspections. In other words, this outcome tests 
whether contributions encourage inspectors to utilize their discretion by granting fewer 
violations that require follow-up inspections. The final outcome measures whether contributions 
drive the number of inspections conducted (granted) under Section 101 Petitions. Section 101 
Petitions are petitions to “modify the application of any mandatory safety standard.” As such 
they lower the compliance burden placed on firms, and it is, therefore, in a firm’s interest to be 
granted such a petition.  
The second equation measures the effect of contributions on the intensity of standard 
inspections. Quality variables tested are the portion of the inspection spent onsite, the number of 
inspectors sent to the site, the amount of time spent inspecting. Inspection outcome variables 
tested include the number of violations and the total penalty cost of those violations.  
The third equation measures the factors that cause higher penalties3 and whether 
                                                
1 Section 103(g) spot inspections are inspections made in response to credible complaints by miners or 
representatives of miners. While certainly discretionary, they are not on expectation random. Further, they are 
dependent on the presence of a complaint, which this dataset cannot control for, hence their exclusion. Section 
103(i) spot inspections are inspections conducted on a mandated interval following the discovery of a known hazard. 
As a result there is no room for discretion – if inspectors find methane above certain levels, they must spot inspect 
once every X days until the hazard has been abated. Without discretionary status, these spot inspections are also 
excluded. 
2 Spot Inspections exclude spot inspections that are limited in scope (e.g., electrical spot inspections, impoundment 
spot inspections), thereby including only spot inspections whose purpose is to ascertain the general condition of the 
mine. 
3 MSHA Penalties are calculated on a points basis. Various factors (e.g. appropriateness of the penalty to the size of 
the business of the operator charged, Repeat Violations Per Inspection Day) accrue points as per a pre-defined 
schedule. These points are converted to penalties using a table specific to the infraction (i.e. 88 points for an 
unwarrantable failure citation would accrue a higher fine than 88 points for a flagrant violation citation). This paper 
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challenges lower those penalties.  
III. Description of Data 
I rely upon two data sets for analysis. The first consists of the records of the Mines Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA). Mining data are strong choice for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the mines industry produces a large sample size – it is one of the most regulated with 
some records reaching back to the formation of the agency in 1978. More importantly, the 
mining regulatory framework includes a number of avenues for inspector discretion, allowing for 
investigation of multiple potential dimensions for capture. This data set includes inspection 
records of mine geography, inspections and violations issued, and operator submitted data on 
accidents.  
This paper’s first regression is run at the mine level. While there are more than 30 types 
of inspections conducted, I choose to focus on those where discretion is most likely – with each 
option yielding important implications on the potential mechanism for capture. Spot inspections 
are the ultimate discretionary tool; it is possible to imagine inspectors harassing companies 
through a glut of inspections. Section 101 petitions loosen safety requirements and do not have a 
definitive, prescribed test. Accordingly, the granting of a Section 101 inspection leaves 
significant room for discretion. It is also possible that inspectors use their discretion to preempt 
future inspections. If this is the case I expect to find fewer inspections as a result of Office 
Generated Violation Activity, i.e., inspections that are mandatory after the finding of certain 
violations. There are a number of mine level control variables that may be included to represent 
the inherent risks present at the mine. These variables include the mine type (both output and 
facility), mine height, the number of producing pits, the use of advanced surface mining 
                                                                                                                                                       
tests whether inspectors use discretion to assign lower levels of negligence, severity, likelihood and/or persons 
potentially affected). 
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techniques (highwall), and total hours of production. Due to limitations in the data set, these 
variables can only be tracked as of the last filing – that is for this paper’s model they cannot vary 
over time, although as most of them are fairly constant characteristics (e.g. mine height) they do 
not. Fortunately, total production hours can be tracked across cycles; however, it is tracked by 
calendar year, rather than the electoral calendar. 
The second set of regressions is run at the inspection level. Again there are many 
opportunities for discretion, leading to multiple outcome variables. The true outcome variable 
that I would like to track is the proportion of all violations detected and addressed. Of course, it 
is simply impossible to do so. The best proxy that can be used are measures of effort, including 
number of staff, time spent by staff, and quality of time spent. At this level, relevant control 
variables relate to the geography of the inspection, including the geography of the mine, as well 
as what portions of the mine were inspected. 
At the violations level, penalty determinants and (for contested penalties) changes in 
penalties provide reasonable room for discretion. In particular, the latter allows us to test the 
concept of bureaucratic squawk minimal behavior, wherein regulators show preferential 
treatment to firms that complain – and especially preferential treatment for influential firms (i.e., 
large political donors) that squawk.  
Political contributions data must be recorded with federal agencies – using data coded by 
Open Secrets and the Center for Responsible Politics, I was able to generate a variable for 
importance of mining contributions by Congressional District. Specifically, I was able to 
aggregate contributions from the coal mining industry and measure them as a percent of all 
contributions in a given Congressional District. While this does not track all potential corporate 
expenditures (indeed, given the rise of the current system of nonprofit-SuperPAC coordination, it 
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would likely be impossible to do so), it is likely that donations by individuals reflect preferences 
similar to the consumption of corporations. Future revisions of this paper will examine PAC and 
other forms of corporate spending. It is difficult to match specific contributions to specific mines 
without uncovering all corporate entities; however, future revisions will attempt this procedure to 
provide additional focus. Of the 435 Congressional Districts in the United States, over the 5 
electoral cycles measured, on average, 84 contained at least one mine. The mean coal 
contribution was quite small at 0.1% of total contributions; however, in the maximum 
contribution was much higher, peaking at 14.8% in 2004. Additional summary statistics are 
presented in Table 2.  
Summary statistics for outcome variables are reported in Table 3, with summary statistics 
for control variables reported in Table 4. 
IV. Results 
 As a preface to regression results, I return to the research questions previously posited. 
Further analysis will be presented subsections I–III. Outcomes were partially consistent with 
respect to the expectations contained in the previously-mentioned research questions: 
 Do inspectors use their discretion to reduce random inspections to contributors? With the 
caveat that regressions seeking to address this question had extremely low explanatory power, 
there is no evidence to suggest that inspectors use their discretion in this manner. 
Do inspectors use their discretion to give out lesser violations to contributors, thereby 
preempting otherwise required inspections associated with higher penalties? Again with the 
caveat that these regressions had low explanatory power, there is evidence to suggest that 
contributors experience fewer inspections that are the result of required follow-ups after 
citations.  
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For inspections of the same character, does the MSHA conduct less thorough inspections 
for contributors? Yes, for regular inspections, the MSHA sends fewer personnel, each of whom 
spends less time inspecting with more of their inspection spent offsite.  
Are negative inspection outcomes reduced for contributors? No. On the contrary, the 
violation per inspection count is actually higher for contributors. 
Do inspectors use their discretion to preempt higher penalties for contributors by 
lessening penalty determinants? Somewhat. While there is no systematic movement by 
inspectors to grant low negligence or low likelihood, there is an association between 
contributions and moderate negligence. Determinations of high negligence and high likelihood 
are also lower for contributors. Findings of no lost days are also higher for contributors. 
Similarly, estimates of the number affected are lower for contributors. 
Does the MSHA minimize squawking by strong firms through reducing penalties for 
contributors that choose to contest their penalty? No. While penalties are on average reduced for 
firms that contest, penalties are increased for contributors that contest their penalties. 
IV.I. Pattern of Random Inspections 
 For each of the four outcome variables, results are estimated under three specifications. 
The first of these examines exclusively the effect of the contributions-percentage by district. This 
specification has little explanatory power in any of the regressions (the highest R-squared across 
the four outcome variables for this specification was 0.0144).  
For Spot Type and Spot Inspections, contributions are positively related to the number of 
inspections. This is contrary to the expectation that contributions would purchase fewer random 
inspections. It is likely that this is a result of district-specific fixed effects. A number of 
contributor districts contain not one, but thousands of mines. With a high concentration of mines 
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in the area, it is likely that (a) miners have more influence on regulators and (2) that these offices 
are more active in conducting inspections. The finding that contributor districts have higher 
levels of spot inspections, then does not preempt stratification within those districts such that 
even though the district as a whole has higher inspection activity, contributor firms within these 
districts would see lower spot inspection activity. Further revisions will focus on testing such a 
hypothesis.  
For inspections that result from previous findings of violations (i.e. Office Generated 
Violations Activity) there is a negative association with contributions. This suggests that 
discretion for contributors comes in the form of preempting future inspections by preempting the 
harshest violations. For the final variable, Section 101 Petition Inspections there is also evidence 
to suggest capture – this initial regression reveals a positive correlation between contributions 
and Section 101 Petition Inspections. Contributor firms ought to favor such inspections, as they 
are intended to weaken safety standards. 
 The next specification introduces variables controlling for the party affiliation of the 
District’s Congressman and the size of the mine. Having a Republican Congressman is correlated 
with a decrease in the number of Spot Type Inspections by 0.593 inspections per cycle, where 
this model explains 13.66% of the variation between panels. It is also correlated with a decrease 
in the number of Spot Inspections by 0.354 inspections per cycle, where this model explains only 
6.49% of variation between mines. This suggests that Republican Congressmen (due to ideology) 
discourage vigorous inspections in their district. For both Spot Type Inspections and Spot 
Inspections, higher cycle production is negatively associated with inspections per cycle, while 
higher cycle employment hours are positively associated with inspections per cycle. This is 
consistent with the mandate of inspectors to reduce the human costs (e.g., injury, death) 
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associated with mining, while maximizing production.  
 With this specification explaining 6.72% of variance between panels, Republican 
Congressmen are correlated with an increase of 0.062 Office Generated Violation Activity 
Inspections per cycle. This minimal effect and counterintuitive effect is again likely a result of 
district-level fixed effects. Due to omitted variable bias, the direction of the coefficients on 
production and employment hours are not accurate in this specification and will be reported in 
the next specification. 
 This specification explains 11.22% of the variance in Section 101 Petition Inspections. 
Here the coefficient on Republican Congressmen is not significant. Again higher cycle 
production is negatively associated with inspections per cycle, while higher cycle employment 
hours is positively associated with inspections per cycle.  
 The final specification introduces mine geography variables and miners’ influence 
variables. Each additional percentage point in contributions increases the number of Spot Type 
Inspections by 0.144 inspections per cycle, where this model explains 24.82% of the variation 
between panels. Each additional percentage point in contributions also increases the number of 
Spot Inspections by 0.05 inspections per cycle, where this model explains 13.90% of the 
variation between panels. As previously reported, this is likely the effect of district-level fixed 
effects.  
 Contributions again has a correlation with Office Generated Violations activity with an 
decrease of 0.03 inspections per cycle for each additional percentage point in contributions, 
where this model explains 9.00% of the variation between panels. Higher cycle production is 
negatively correlated with these inspections, while higher cycle employment is positively 
correlated with inspections, which again points to the dual nature of the MSHA mandate. 
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 Contributions are positively associated with Section 101 Petition Inspections, with an 
increase of 0.003 of inspections per percentage point in contributions, where this model explains 
14.49% of variation between panels.  
 Full results can be found in Tables 5–8. 
IV.II. Nature of Standard Inspections 
Estimates of the intensity of inspection are also run for several outcome variables with 
each outcome variable representing a proxy for capturable outcome. This analysis relies on a 
dataset that has been pared to include only Regular Safety and Health Inspections, as these ought 
to – conditional on inspection geography – be similar in nature. There is evidence to support the 
proposition that inspectors conduct shoddier inspections for contributors: While not statistically 
significant, contributions are associated with fewer inspectors sent to these Regular Inspections.  
Inspection time is lower for contributors: Each additional percentage point in contributions 
(conditional on number of inspectors) is associated with 0.64 fewer hours spent inspecting, 
where this model explains 82.7% of the variation. However, of these inspection hours, more are 
spent on-site: Each additional percentage point in contributions is associated with 0.187% more 
hours spent on-site, where this model explains 21.2% of variation. Again, this is likely due to 
district-level fixed effects.  
Perversely, then, there is evidence positively correlating contributions with violations 
issued per inspection – each additional percentage point in contributions is associated with 0.17 
more violations, where this model explains 51.5% of variation. In part, this ought to be due to the 
percentage of time spent on-site – even though inspectors are spending less time inspecting, 
more of it is spent inspecting the mine, rather than examining records or writing inspection 
reports. Further, this is likely due to district-level fixed effects, wherein more vigorous MSHA 
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offices are located in high-contributor districts, leading to higher inspection activity and 
citations, but allowing for the possibility of stratification once controlling for this effect. In large 
part due to the number of violations, each additional percentage point in contributions is 
correlated with an additional $167.53 in penalties, where this model explains 19.0% of variation. 
While not statistically significant, controlling for the number of citations, leads to a negative 
association between contributions and penalty size. 
Full results can be found in Tables 9–10. 
IV.III. Penalties 
 Many of the determinants of penalties are categorical, rather than numerical. For these 
categories, I compare the linear probability of the possible findings, looking for evidence to 
suggest a positive systematic variance between contributions and findings of lower and more 
moderate categories, and a negative systematic variance between contributions and findings of 
higher categories. There is some evidence to suggest that while inspectors do not assign the 
lowest finding to contributors, they shield them from categories associated with harsher 
penalties. For negligence, there is not enough evidence to reject the finding that extreme findings 
(i.e., no negligence, recklessness) are not assigned significantly more or less to contributors; 
however, in regressions explaining 0.9%, 0.8% and 0.2% of variance, contributions are 
associated with a higher probability of determinations of low or moderate negligence and a lower 
probability of determinations of high negligence. As part of the penalty determination, inspectors 
also select the likelihood of an accident. In a model explaining 0.0% of variance, contributions 
are associated with a higher probability of having an accident occur. Nevertheless, in inspector 
determinations, contributors are shielded – there is a higher probability that they will be assigned 
a finding of reasonably likely, where the model explains 0.8% of variance. Oddly, there is a 
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lower probability that they will be assigned a finding of unlikely, where the model explains 0.7% 
of variance. The final categorical comparison I test is severity. Again, there is evidence to 
suggest shielding – while contributors are more likely to receive findings of permanent injury or 
fatal injury, they are also more likely to receive findings of no lost days (in regressions 
explaining 1.2%, 0.5% and 0.7% of variation, respectively). Inspectors also assign the (likely) 
number affected by an accident were it to occur. As this is not categorical, no comparison is 
necessary. Each additional percentage point in contributions is associated with a determination 
that 0.02 fewer people would be affected, where the model explains 0.1% of variation.  
 I also test the possibility that the MSHA minimizes squawking by strong firms through 
reducing penalties for contributors that choose to contest their penalty. Each additional 
percentage point in contributions is associated with an additional $58.62 in penalties after the 
review process is complete, where this model explains 0.8% of variance. Which is to say, that 
there is no evidence that the MSHA minimizes squawking for strong firms. It does, however, still 
suggest capture. Administrative judges (who are better insulated from political pressure) in their 
reviews of inspector determinations actually find excessive leniency toward contributors, 
choosing to raise penalties on them. These findings, of course, come with the caveat that these 
models have extremely low explanatory power, suggesting that penalties are best explained by 
factors other than contributions.  
 Full results can be found in Tables 11–15. A summary of results is provided below in 
Table 16. 
TABLE 16.     Summary of Results 
Research Question Variable Significance R-Square Comment 
(1) Do inspectors use their 
discretion to reduce random 
inspections to contributors?  
Spot Type 
Inspections 
14.40*** 0.248 
(Between) 
Inconsistent sign 
likely due to 
district-level fixed 
effects 
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 Spot 
Inspections 
4,937*** 0.139 
(Between) 
 
 §101 0.289*** 0.145 
(Between) 
Consistent w/ 
capture 
(2) Do inspectors use their 
discretion to give out lesser 
violations to contributors, 
thereby preempting otherwise 
required inspections 
associated with higher 
penalties? 
 
Office 
Generated 
Violation 
Activity 
-2.565*** 0.090 
(Between) 
Consistent w/ 
capture 
(3) For inspections of the 
same character, does the 
MSHA conduct less thorough 
inspections for contributors?  
Number of 
Inspectors 
-0.579 0.509 Not significant; 
consistent w/ 
capture 
 Total 
Inspection 
Time 
-64.85*** 0.827 Consistent w/ 
capture 
 On-Site/ 
Total 
Hours 
0.187*** 0.212 Inconsistent sign 
likely due to 
district-level fixed 
effects 
(4) Are negative inspection 
outcomes reduced for 
contributors? 
Number of 
Violations 
17.18*** 0.515 Inconsistent sign 
likely due to 
district-level fixed 
effects 
 Total 
Penalties 
16,753*** 0.190 Inconsistent sign 
likely due to 
district-level fixed 
effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Penalties 
(Constant 
Violation 
Count) 
-2,762 0.439 Not significant; 
sign consistent w/ 
capture 
(5) Do inspectors use their 
discretion to preempt higher 
penalties for contributors by 
lessening penalty 
determinants?  
Low 
Negligence 
0.0708** 0.009 Consistent w/ 
capture 
Moderate 
Negligence 
0.163*** 0.008 Consistent w/ 
capture 
High 
Negligence 
-0.231*** 0.002 Consistent w/ 
capture 
 Not Likely 0.0159 0.001 Not significant; 
sign consistent 
w/capture 
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 Unlikely -0.966*** 0.007 Inconsistent w/ 
capture; likely due 
to shielding from 
highest penalties 
rather than 
complete capture 
 Reasonably 
Likely 
0.963*** 0.008 Consistent w/ 
capture 
 No Lost 
Days 
0.420*** 0.012 Consistent w/ 
capture 
 Lost Days -0.844*** 0.007 Inconsistent w/ 
capture; likely due 
to shielding from 
highest penalties 
rather than 
complete capture 
 
 
 
Persons 
Affected 
-1.839*** 0.001 Consistent w/ 
capture 
(6) Does the MSHA minimize 
squawking by strong firms 
through reducing penalties for 
contributor firms that choose 
to contest their penalty? 
Change in 
Penalty 
5,862*** 0.008 Inconsistent w/ 
squawk 
minimizing 
behavior; 
consistent w/ 
capture 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
V. Conclusions 
 The testing performed suggests that there is evidence that MHSA has been captured by 
contributions as evident in the findings regarding interpreting systematic inspection patterns. In 
the pattern of inspections, inspectors conduct fewer follow-up inspections and are more likely to 
consider lowering safety standards. While conducting the inspections themselves, each inspector 
spends less time inspecting. When determining penalties, inspectors are more likely to assign 
contributors moderate determinations. Further, when politically insulated judges review those 
moderate findings, they find that evidence of excess leniency, choosing to raise penalties. These 
findings are consistent with previous research finding that regulators are corruptible. In 
particular, these findings align with Gordon and Hafer (2005), whose game-theoretical modeling 
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posited contributions as a signaling mechanism and whose empirical analysis of nuclear power-
plant inspections found a negative association between inspection time and contributions. They 
are also consistent with Campos and Giovannoni (2007) whose cross-country empirical analysis 
finds that political expenditures are highly effective in engendering capture. 
 To the extent that these findings are based on district-level conclusions, they present two 
key limitations: (1)  they do not control for district-level fixed effects and (2) they suggest a free-
rider problem (i.e., if district-level contributions matter more than mine-level contributions, then 
there is little incentive to contribute). Future revisions ought to either account for district-level 
fixed effects or match contributions to mining companies, rather than districts. A full accounting 
of expenditures (rather than just contributions) could also increase accuracy. 
While this research suggests capture at the MSHA, it cannot be applied generally – the 
MSHA’s specific design could leave it more prone to capture. Assuming that the MSHA were an 
average agency, this suggests that capture can be achieved for surprisingly little in contributions 
– at an average of $1.1 million in expenditures per seat (in 2008), it would take only $11,000 to 
achieve the marginal impacts described in this paper. In other words, under this assumption, it 
takes only three persons donating at the statutory maximum to achieve a reasonable degree of 
capture.  
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APPENDIX A. Data Dictionary 
 
TABLE 1.     Data Dictionary 
Variable Type Definition 
Coal/Total Contributions Percentage Aggregate coal contributions divided by total 
contributions in a Congressional District 
Republican 
Congressman 
Indicator District has Republican Congressman 
Spot Type Inspections Count Count of Spot Type Inspections (all Spot Inspections 
excluding 103(g) and 103(i)) in an election cycle 
Spot Inspections Count Count of Spot Inspections in an election sycle 
Office Generated 
Violation Activity 
Count Count of Office Generated Violation Activity 
Inspections in an election cycle 
Section 101 Petition Count Count of Section 101 Petition Inspections in an election 
cycle 
Cycle Employment 
Hours 
Numeric Total employment hours in the two calendar years 
closest matching the election cycle 
Production Numeric Total coal production in the two calendar years closest 
matching the election cycle 
Average Mine Height Numeric Average mining height in inches 
Number of Non-
Producing Pits 
Numeric Number of pits that are not producing materials at the 
mine location  
Miles from Office Numeric Driving distance to the mine/mill from the office 
responsible for conducting inspection. 
Anthracite Coal Indicator Mine produces anthracite coal 
Bituminous Coal Indicator Mine produces bituminous coal 
Lignite Coal Indicator Mine produces lignite coal 
Portable Mine Indicator Indicator denoting whether this is a portable mine 
Highwall Miner Indicator Indicator denoting whether or not a mine uses a 
highwall miner (surface coal only) 
Safety Committee Indicator Indicator denoting whether there a safety committee at 
the mine location 
Surface Mine Indicator Indicator denoting whether the mine is a surface mine 
Facility Mine Indicator Indicator denoting whether the mine is a facility mine 
Underground Mine Indicator Indicator denoting whether the mine is an underground 
mine 
Number of Inspectors Numeric Total number of inspectors working on the inspection 
Total On-Site Hours Numeric Total hours recorded on the Weekly Time and Activity 
Data form: On-Site Inspection Time (MNM), MMU Pit 
Time (C), Outby (Coal UG Mines), Surface Area Time 
(C) and C/O Writing On Site (MNM, C), including Task 
code S,T,O hours  
Total Inspection Hours Numeric Total hours recorded on the Weekly Time and Activity 
Data form: On-Site Inspection Time (MNM), MMU Pit 
Time (C), Outby (Coal UG mines), Surface Area Time 
(C), C/O Writing On Site (MNM,C), C/O Writing Off 
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Site, Travel, Other, including Task code S,T,O  
No. of Active Sections 
Inspected 
Numeric Number of active working sections inspected  
No. of Idle Sections 
Inspected 
Numeric Number of idle working sections inspected  
No. of Shaft/Slope 
Sinking Construction 
Areas Inspected 
Numeric Number of shaft/slope sinking construction areas 
inspected  
No. of Impoundment 
Construction Operations 
Inspected 
Numeric Number of impoundment construction operations 
inspected  
No. of Building 
Construction Sites 
Inspected 
Numeric Number of building construction sites inspected  
No. of Draglines/Shovel 
Construction Operations 
Inspected 
Numeric Number of draglines/shovel construction operations 
inspected 
No. of Other 
Unclassified 
Construction Sites 
Inspected 
Numeric Number of other unclassified construction areas 
inspected  
Records Inspected Indicator Company records inspected indicator  
Surface 
Area/Underground Mine 
Inspected 
Indicator Surface area/underground mine inspected indicator  
Surface Mine/Facility 
Inspected 
Indicator Surface mine/facility inspected indicator  
Identified Refuse Piles 
Inspected 
Indicator Identified refuse piles inspected indicator  
Outby Areas Inspected Indicator Outby areas inspected indicator  
Major Construction 
Operation Inspected 
Indicator Major construction operation inspected indicator  
Shafts/Slopes Inspected Indicator Shafts/slopes inspected indicator  
Identified 
Impoundments Inspected 
Indicator Identified impoundments inspected indicator  
Explosives Storage 
Inspected 
Indicator Explosives storage inspected indicator  
Misc. Areas Inspected Indicator Coal areas of inspection Not Elsewhere Classified 
(NEC) indicator  
No Negligence Indicator Indicator denoting a determination of no negligence 
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the 
violation.  
Low Negligence Indicator Indicator denoting a determination of low negligence 
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the 
violation. 
Moderate Negligence Indicator Indicator denoting a determination of moderate 
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negligence assigned by the inspector to the violator due 
to the violation. 
High Negligence Indicator Indicator denoting a determination of high negligence 
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the 
violation. 
Reckless Indicator Indicator denoting a determination of recklessness 
assigned by the inspector to the violator due to the 
violation. 
Not Likely Indicator Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited 
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an 
accident as not likely 
Unlikely Indicator Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited 
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an 
accident as unlikely 
Reasonably Likely Indicator Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited 
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an 
accident as not likely 
Highly Likely Indicator Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited 
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an 
accident as highly likely 
Occurred Indicator 
 
Indicator of the seriousness of the violation being cited 
as measured by the likelihood of the occurrence of an 
accident as occurred 
No Lost Days Indicator 
 
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as 
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons 
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the 
violation as no lost days  
Lost Days Indicator 
 
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as 
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons 
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the 
violation as lost days 
Permanent Indicator 
 
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as 
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons 
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the 
violation as permanent injuries 
Fatal Indicator 
 
Indicator of seriousness of violation being cited as 
measured by severity of the injury or illness to persons 
if accident were to occur due to the conditions of the 
violation as no fatal 
Number Affected due to 
Violation 
Numeric Measure of the number of persons affected or 
potentially affected by the conditions at the Mine due to 
the violation  
Change in Penalty Numeric Final assessed penalty less proposed penalty 
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APPENDIX B. Summary Statistics 
TABLE 2.     Summary Statistics for Primary Explanatory Variable of Interest 
Variable 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Number of Congressional Districts 435 435 435 435 435 
Number of Congressional Districts with at Least One 
Mine 82 79 115 71 73 
Number of Congressional Districts with More than One 
Mine 68 62 87 48 49 
Mean Contribution 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
Standard Deviation 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 
Minimum Contribution 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum Contribution 0.104 0.148 0.112 0.064 0.058 
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TABLE 3.     Summary Statistics for Response Variables of Interest 
Type Sub-Type 
Response 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Patterns of 
Discretionary 
Inspections 
 Spot Type 
n = 8,292 2.592 3.856 0.000 62.000 
 Spot Inspections 
n = 8,292 1.888 3.140 0.000 62.000 
 Office Generated 
Violation 
Activity 
n = 8,292 
0.269 0.446 0.000 3.000 
 Section 101 
Petition 
Inspection 
n = 8,292 
0.042 0.296 0.000 6.000 
Standard 
Inspection 
Quality Inspection Spent 
On-Site 
n = 59,988 
0.615 0.140 0.031 1.000 
Number of 
Inspectors 
n = 54,381 
2.282 2.291 0.000 33.000 
Total Inspection 
Hours 
n = 54,381 
101.881 167.047 0.000 3337.250 
Outcome Number of 
Violations Issued 
n = 122,123 
8.169 18.834 0.000 701.000 
Aggregate Value 
of Penalties 
Proposed 
n =122,123 
5,606.361 41,662.890 0.000 9,228,521.000 
Penalties 
Assessed with 
Violation 
Negligence No  
n = 761,238 0.002 0.042 0.000 1.000 
 Low 
n = 761,238 0.097 0.296 0.000 1.000 
  Moderate 
n = 761,238 0.861 0.346 0.000 1.000 
  High 
n = 761,238 0.040 0.195 0.000 1.000 
  Reckless 
n = 761,238 0.001 0.034 0.000 1.000 
 Likelihood No Likelihood 
n = 761,228 0.026 0.161 0.000 1.000 
  Unlikely 
n = 761,228 0.602 0.489 0.000 1.000 
  Reasonably 
Likely 
n = 761,228 
0.360 0.480 0.000 1.000 
  Highly Likely 
n = 761,228 0.008 0.091 0.000 1.000 
  Occurred 
n = 761,228 0.002 0.050 0.000 1.000 
 Severity No Lost Days 
n = 761,227 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000 
  Lost Days 
n = 761,227 0.683 0.465 0.000 1.000 
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  Permanent 
n = 761,227 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000 
  Fatal 
n = 761,227 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000 
 Number 
Affected 
Persons Affected 
n = 777,793 1.974 9.209 0.000 999.000 
 Change in 
Penalty 
Penalty Due Less 
Proposed Penalty  
n = 754,978 
-123.187 1,628.456 -220,000.000 104,600.000 
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TABLE 4.     Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
Type Control Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Mine-Level 
Control 
Variables  
Average Mine Height 
n = 15,103 48.364 111.979 0.000 9,998.000 
Number of Non-
Producing Pits  
n = 13,628 
0.227 0.516 0.000 12.000 
Miles from Office 
n = 34,977 1.993 10.008 0.000 340.000 
Anthracite Coal  
n = 34,977 0.043 0.202 0.000 1.000 
 Bituminous Coal 
n = 34,977 0.947 0.224 0.000 1.000 
 Lignite Coal 
n = 34,977 0.004 0.062 0.000 1.000 
 Portable Mine 
n = 34,977 0.013 0.115 0.000 1.000 
 Highwall Mining 
n = 34,977 0.005 0.071 0.000 1.000 
 Facility Mine 
n = 34,973 0.096 0.295 0.000 1.000 
 Surface Mine 
n = 34,973 0.488 0.500 0.000 1.000 
 Underground Mine 
n = 34,973 0.416 0.493 0.000 1.000 
 Safety Committee 
n = 34,977 0.056 0.229 0.000 1.000 
 Production 
n = 11,772 949,686.600 6,290,154.000 0.000 204,000,000.000 
 Employment 
n = 11,772 153,492.100 357,930.900 1.000 6,019,235.000 
Inspection-
Level Control 
Variables 
(Limited to 
Regular 
Inspections) 
No. of Active 
Sections Inspected 
n = 54,381 
1.096 1.952 0.000 99.000 
No. of Idle Sections 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.097 0.490 0.000 52.000 
No. of Shaft/Slope 
Sinking Construction 
Areas Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.006 0.092 0.000 4.000 
 No. of Impoundment 
Construction 
Operations Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.002 0.044 0.000 2.000 
 No. of Building 
Construction Sites 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.003 0.064 0.000 3.000 
 No. of 
Draglines/Shovel 
Construction 
Operations Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.003 0.080 0.000 5.000 
 No. of Other 0.014 0.173 0.000 10.000 
 35 
Unclassified 
Construction Sites 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
 Records Inspected 
n = 54,381 0.878 0.328 0.000 1.000 
 Surface 
Area/Underground 
Mine Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.538 0.499 0.000 1.000 
 Surface Mine/Facility 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.478 0.499 0.000 1.000 
 Identified Refuse 
Piles Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000 
 Outby Areas 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.388 0.487 0.000 1.000 
 Major Construction 
Operation Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.019 0.138 0.000 1.000 
 Shafts/Slopes 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.046 0.209 0.000 1.000 
 Identified 
Impoundments 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.087 0.282 0.000 1.000 
 Explosives Storage 
Inspected 
n = 54,381 
0.235 0.424 0.000 1.000 
 Misc. Areas Inspected 
n = 54,381 0.039 0.193 0.000 1.000 
Violation-
Level Control 
Variables 
2002 Cycle 
n = 777,793 0.160 0.367 0.000 1.000 
 2004 Cycle 
n = 777,793 0.151 0.358 0.000 1.000 
 2006 Cycle 
n = 777,793 0.189 0.391 0.000 1.000 
 
 
2008 Cycle 
n = 777,793 0.241  0.427 0.000 1.000 
2010 Cycle 
n = 777,793 0.260 0.439 0.000 1.000 
 Contested 
n = 777,793 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 
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APPENDIX C. Main Estimates 
TABLE 5.     Spot Type Inspection Estimates 
VARIABLES Spot Type Spot Type Spot Type 
    
Coal/Total Contributions 13.78*** 17.64*** 14.40*** 
 (1.728) (1.601) (1.538) 
Republican Congressman  -0.593*** -0.497*** 
  (0.102) (0.0982) 
Cycle Employment Hours  3.24e-06*** 2.71e-06*** 
  (5.23e-07) (5.33e-07) 
Cycle Production  -6.30e-08*** -4.39e-08** 
  (1.84e-08) (1.77e-08) 
Average Mine Height   0.000125*** 
   (4.79e-05) 
Number of Non-Producing Pits   -0.00882 
   (0.0605) 
Miles from Office   -0.00927*** 
   (0.00191) 
Anthracite Coal   0.137 
   (0.365) 
Bituminous Coal   0.854** 
   (0.339) 
Portable Mine    -0.315** 
   (0.156) 
Highwall Mining   0.569*** 
   (0.153) 
Safety Committee   0.197 
   (0.216) 
Surface Mine   -1.869*** 
   (0.105) 
Facility Mine   -1.871*** 
   (0.236) 
Constant 2.157*** 1.937*** 2.471*** 
 (0.0728) (0.106) (0.383) 
    
Observations 8,107 8,107 8,107 
Number of Mines 2,904 2,904 2,904 
R-squared    
   Within  0.0041 0.0108 0.0109 
   Between  0.0171 0.1366 0.2482 
   Overall 0.0144 0.0956 0.1588 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6.     Spot Inspection Estimates 
VARIABLES Spot Inspections Spot Inspections Spot Inspections 
    
Coal/Total Contributions 5.071*** 7.293*** 4.937*** 
 (1.269) (1.154) (1.160) 
Republican Congressman  -0.354*** -0.300*** 
  (0.0840) (0.0824) 
Cycle Employment Hours  2.20e-06*** 1.90e-06*** 
  (4.79e-07) (4.94e-07) 
Production  -3.92e-08** -2.69e-08 
  (1.83e-08) (1.77e-08) 
Average Mine Height   0.000170*** 
   (3.98e-05) 
Number of Non-Producing Pits   -0.0106 
   (0.0416) 
Miles from Office   -0.00686*** 
   (0.00171) 
Anthracite Coal   0.512* 
   (0.303) 
Bituminous Coal   0.787*** 
   (0.261) 
Portable Mine   -0.0898 
   (0.160) 
Highwall Miner   0.629*** 
   (0.148) 
Safety Committee   -0.0423 
   (0.195) 
Surface Mine   -1.146*** 
   (0.0922) 
Facility Mine   -1.451*** 
   (0.159) 
Constant 1.732*** 1.553*** 1.637*** 
 (0.0618) (0.0925) (0.308) 
    
Observations 8,107 8,107 8,107 
Number of Mines 2,904 2,904 2,904 
R-squared    
   Within 0.0001 0.0213 0.0228 
   Between 0.0042 0.0649 0.1390 
   Overall 0.0035 0.0514 0.0885 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 7.     Office Generated Violation Activity Inspection Estimates 
VARIABLES OGVA OGVA OGVA 
    
Coal/Total Contributions -2.142*** -2.403*** -2.565*** 
 (0.148) (0.155) (0.160) 
Republican Congressman  0.0615*** 0.0604*** 
  (0.00615) (0.00618) 
Cycle Employment Hours  -6.55e-08*** -5.33e-08*** 
  (8.97e-09) (9.20e-09) 
Production  -1.00e-10 7.35e-11 
  (4.65e-10) (3.58e-10) 
Average Mine Height   -2.02e-05*** 
   (6.65e-06) 
Number of Non-Producing Pits   -0.00505 
   (0.00346) 
Miles from Office   -0.000545*** 
   (0.000108) 
Anthracite Coal   0.0699*** 
   (0.0191) 
Bituminous Coal   0.0630*** 
   (0.0143) 
Portable Mine   0.0700*** 
   (0.0120) 
Highwall Miner   0.0459*** 
   (0.0174) 
Safety Committee   -0.0317*** 
   (0.00831) 
Surface Mine   -0.0314*** 
   (0.00639) 
Facility Mine   -0.0537*** 
   (0.0149) 
Constant 0.328*** 0.314*** 0.280*** 
 (0.00519) (0.00584) (0.0157) 
    
Observations 8,107 8,107 8,107 
Number of Mines 2,904 2,904 2,904 
R-squared    
   Within 0.0242 0.0266 0.0267 
   Between 0.0353 0.0672 0.0900 
   Overall 0.0175 0.0253 0.0308 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 8.     Section 101 Petition Inspection Estimates 
VARIABLES §101 §101 §101 
    
Coal/Total Contributions 0.380*** 0.470*** 0.289** 
 (0.143) (0.138) (0.140) 
Republican Congressman  0.00264 0.0148** 
  (0.00692) (0.00720) 
Cycle Employment Hours  1.55e-07*** 1.27e-07*** 
  (2.34e-08) (2.34e-08) 
Production  -3.78e-09*** -2.91e-09*** 
  (6.09e-10) (5.62e-10) 
Average Mine Height   7.10e-07 
   (2.00e-06) 
Number of Non-Producing Pits   -0.00901*** 
   (0.00260) 
Miles from Office   0.000113 
   (0.000112) 
Anthracite Coal   0.0687*** 
   (0.0260) 
Bituminous Coal   0.0282 
   (0.0205) 
Portable Mine   0.00738* 
   (0.00431) 
Highwall Miner   -0.00253 
   (0.00633) 
Safety Committee   0.0459** 
   (0.0212) 
Surface Mine   -0.0718*** 
   (0.00774) 
Facility Mine   -0.0748*** 
   (0.00840) 
Constant 0.0300*** 0.00273 0.0119 
 (0.00553) (0.00597) (0.0217) 
    
Observations 8,107 8,107 8,107 
Number of Mines 2,904 2,904 2,904 
R-squared    
   Within 0.0026 0.0081 0.0097 
   Between 0.0017 0.1122 0.1449 
   Overall 0.0013 0.0283 0.0467 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 9.     Standard Inspection Quality Estimates 
VARIABLES 
On-Site/ 
Total 
Number of 
Inspectors 
Total Inspec- 
tion Hours 
    
Coal/Total Contributions 0.187*** -0.579 -64.85*** 
 (0.0345) (0.481) (20.85) 
Number of Inspectors ––– ––– 31.62*** 
   (1.075) 
No. of Active Sections Inspected 0.00548*** 0.0141 3.976*** 
 (0.000971) (0.0168) (1.361) 
No. of Idle Sections Inspected -0.0130*** -0.119*** 0.571 
 (0.00318) (0.0309) (0.786) 
No. of Shaft/Slope Sinking  0.00167 0.214 -0.491 
   Construction Areas Inspected (0.00780) (0.241) (14.44) 
No. of Impoundment Construction 0.0161 1.296** -16.72 
   Operations Inspected (0.0128) (0.543) (21.21) 
No. of Building Construction 0.0175** 0.257 -36.78*** 
   Sites Inspected (0.00857) (0.216) (14.04) 
No. of Draglines/Shovel Construction -0.00889* -0.288* -37.69*** 
   Operations Inspected (0.00464) (0.159) (8.238) 
No. of Other Unclassified Construc- 0.0113*** 0.00239 -5.572 
   tion Sites Inspected (0.00333) (0.0800) (3.484) 
Records Inspected 0.129*** 0.00324 1.457 
 (0.00385) (0.0292) (1.333) 
Surface Area/Underground Mine -0.0295*** -0.138*** -5.000*** 
   Inspected (0.00278) (0.0352) (1.488) 
Surface Mine/Facility Inspected 0.0113*** -0.0585 1.120 
 (0.00252) (0.0402) (1.736) 
Identified Refuse Piles Inspected 0.00819** 0.176** 2.730 
 (0.00411) (0.0719) (2.761) 
Outby Areas Inspected 0.0697*** 0.809*** 39.19*** 
 (0.00432) (0.0516) (2.319) 
Major Construction Operation -0.00433 -0.0555 20.35** 
   Inspected (0.00629) (0.152) (8.975) 
Shafts/Slopes Inspected -0.0202*** 0.709*** 15.47*** 
 (0.00450) (0.119) (5.202) 
Identified Impoundments -0.0152*** 0.229** -7.354** 
   Inspected (0.00547) (0.0902) (3.684) 
Explosives Storage Inspected 0.0297*** 0.0521 0.970 
 (0.00207) (0.0347) (1.602) 
Misc. Areas Inspected 0.0212*** -0.0714* 3.318 
 (0.00364) (0.0396) (2.259) 
Anthracite Coal 0.0622*** 1.258*** 62.26*** 
 (0.0178) (0.245) (11.34) 
Bituminous Coal 0.0299* 1.387*** 52.91*** 
 (0.0173) (0.238) (10.94) 
Surface Mine 0.0403*** -0.586*** -9.292*** 
 (0.00493) (0.0772) (2.713) 
Facility Mine 0.0604*** -0.206*** -3.740 
 (0.00545) (0.0705) (2.671) 
Cycle Employment Hours 2.94e-08*** 3.61e-06*** 0.000212*** 
 (4.93e-09) (1.98e-07) (1.18e-05) 
Cycle Production -4.39e-10 -7.93e-08*** -4.35e-06*** 
 (2.72e-10) (9.01e-09) (4.29e-07) 
Miner Act Passed -0.00844*** 0.0117 4.717*** 
 (0.00271) (0.0365) (1.563) 
Republican Congressman 0.0128*** 0.214*** 0.682 
 (0.00247) (0.0386) (1.860) 
2004 Cycle 0.00412** 0.196*** 0.149 
 (0.00193) (0.0213) (0.937) 
2006 Cycle 0.00300 0.556*** -2.934** 
 (0.00228) (0.0292) (1.265) 
2008 Cycle 0.00475 0.788*** 11.32*** 
 (0.00346) (0.0465) (1.994) 
2010 Cycle 0.0256*** 1.207*** 14.47*** 
 (0.00353) (0.0553) (2.339) 
Constant 0.401*** -0.374 -81.43*** 
 (0.0182) (0.247) (11.38) 
    
Observations 48,911 49,179 49,179 
R-squared 0.212 0.509 0.827 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 10.     Standard Inspection Outcome Estimates 
VARIABLES No. of Violations Total Penalty Total Penalty 
    
Coal/Total Contributions 17.18*** 16,753** -2,762 
 (5.328) (7,916) (5,842) 
Number of Violations   1,136*** 
   (111.5) 
No. of Active Sections Inspected 0.609** -122.5 -814.2*** 
 (0.244) (364.2) (224.1) 
No. of Idle Sections Inspected -1.084*** -716.4** 515.1** 
 (0.326) (338.9) (260.7) 
No. of Shaft/Slope Sinking  1.331 11,855 10,342 
   Construction Areas Inspected (3.330) (11,573) (9,833) 
No. of Impoundment Construction 0.391 -4,403 -4,847 
   Operations Inspected (4.407) (11,597) (7,752) 
No. of Building Construction -5.479* -14,190 -7,965 
   Sites Inspected (3.241) (10,730) (7,415) 
No. of Draglines/Shovel Construction -4.685** -11,853** -6,531** 
   Operations Inspected (2.330) (4,708) (2,632) 
No. of Other Unclassified Construc- -0.160 -5,693* -5,511** 
   tion Sites Inspected (1.078) (3,400) (2,618) 
Records Inspected 0.442 -843.0 -1,345*** 
 (0.323) (631.4) (483.9) 
Surface Area/Underground Mine -1.907*** -1,348 819.3 
   Inspected (0.415) (897.3) (775.1) 
Surface Mine/Facility Inspected -0.829* 1,180 2,122** 
 (0.480) (1,142) (940.9) 
Identified Refuse Piles Inspected 1.538* -2,033* -3,780*** 
 (0.875) (1,127) (917.7) 
Outby Areas Inspected 8.566*** 4,420*** -5,313*** 
 (0.539) (799.0) (1,052) 
Major Construction Operation 2.375 13,408 10,710* 
   Inspected (2.416) (8,300) (5,915) 
Shafts/Slopes Inspected 4.019** 3,738 -829.3 
 (1.571) (2,788) (2,258) 
Identified Impoundments -0.275 -2,399 -2,087** 
   Inspected (0.969) (1,463) (908.7) 
Explosives Storage Inspected 2.231*** 94.13 -2,441*** 
 (0.464) (930.1) (761.5) 
Misc. Areas Inspected -1.117** -440.3 828.7 
 (0.505) (695.5) (540.0) 
Anthracite Coal 11.55*** 13,520*** 391.2 
 (2.659) (3,684) (1,237) 
Bituminous Coal 13.13*** 13,007*** -1,914* 
 (2.510) (3,137) (1,147) 
Surface Mine -4.184*** -4,127*** 626.4 
 (0.684) (944.5) (792.2) 
Facility Mine -0.520 -1,709* -1,118 
 (0.729) (946.3) (696.6) 
Cycle Employment Hours 4.24e-05*** 0.0436*** -0.00457 
 (3.03e-06) (0.00635) (0.00307) 
Cycle Production -1.01e-06*** -0.00110*** 4.99e-05 
 (1.08e-07) (0.000193) (7.04e-05) 
Miner Act Passed 2.086*** 1,753*** -617.5 
 (0.427) (583.4) (603.3) 
Republican Congressman 2.181*** 839.3 -1,639*** 
 (0.489) (856.3) (485.6) 
2004 Cycle 1.018*** 154.8 -1,002*** 
 (0.239) (220.0) (309.1) 
2006 Cycle 2.890*** 550.6 -2,733*** 
 (0.366) (373.1) (672.4) 
2008 Cycle 5.017*** 11,461*** 5,760*** 
 (0.540) (1,104) (872.7) 
2010 Cycle 4.801*** 10,065*** 4,610*** 
 (0.630) (1,148) (1,024) 
Constant -14.91*** -17,773*** -826.8 
 (2.641) (3,836) (1,217) 
    
Observations 49,179 49,179 49,179 
R-squared 0.515 0.190 0.439 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 11.     Negligence Determination Estimates 
VARIABLES 
No 
Negligence 
Low 
Negligence 
Moderate 
Negligence 
High 
Negligence Reckless 
      
Coal/Total Contributions -0.00314 0.0708** 0.163*** -0.231*** 0.000799 
 (0.00333) (0.0301) (0.0338) (0.0196) (0.00273) 
Republican Congressman -0.000702*** -0.0418*** 0.0396*** 0.00331*** -0.000357** 
 (0.000196) (0.00180) (0.00204) (0.00122) (0.000173) 
2004 Cycle -0.000374 -0.00600** 0.00812*** -0.00207 0.000321 
 (0.000371) (0.00266) (0.00304) (0.00163) (0.000279) 
2006 Cycle -0.000986*** -0.0179*** 0.0209*** -0.00222 0.000221 
 (0.000335) (0.00263) (0.00307) (0.00182) (0.000239) 
2008 Cycle -0.000253 0.0175*** -0.0198*** 0.00216 0.000372 
 (0.000343) (0.00286) (0.00314) (0.00169) (0.000244) 
2010 Cycle -0.000598* 0.0269*** -0.0369*** 0.0101*** 0.000495** 
 (0.000329) (0.00280) (0.00312) (0.00180) (0.000239) 
Constant 0.00265*** 0.110*** 0.844*** 0.0418*** 0.00105*** 
 (0.000329) (0.00258) (0.00288) (0.00156) (0.000213) 
      
Observations 726,434 726,434 726,434 726,434 726,434 
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 12.     Likelihood Determination Estimates 
VARIABLES Not Likely Unlikely Reasonably Likely Highly Likely Occurred 
      
Coal/Total  0.0159 -0.966*** 0.963*** -0.000795 -0.0122*** 
   Contributions (0.0132) (0.0511) (0.0498) (0.00701) (0.00343) 
Republican  -0.00499*** 0.0168*** -0.0111*** -0.000314 -0.000447** 
   Congressman (0.000747) (0.00254) (0.00245) (0.000380) (0.000214) 
2004 Cycle -0.00223** -0.0101** 0.0128*** -0.000709 0.000224 
 (0.00107) (0.00449) (0.00441) (0.000607) (0.000319) 
2006 Cycle -0.00213* -0.0186*** 0.0190*** 0.00136** 0.000368 
 (0.00115) (0.00461) (0.00446) (0.000670) (0.000337) 
2008 Cycle 0.00301*** 0.0421*** -0.0462*** 0.000969 0.000175 
 (0.00107) (0.00413) (0.00400) (0.000640) (0.000336) 
2010 Cycle 0.00705*** 0.0538*** -0.0596*** -0.00110* -0.000222 
 (0.00124) (0.00409) (0.00394) (0.000624) (0.000298) 
Constant 0.0274*** 0.600*** 0.361*** 0.00850*** 0.00305*** 
 (0.00104) (0.00400) (0.00387) (0.000603) (0.000298) 
      
Observations 726,424 726,424 726,424 726,424 726,424 
R-squared 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 13.     Severity Determination Estimates 
VARIABLES No Lost Days Lost_Days Permanent Fatal 
     
Coal/Total Contributions 0.420*** -0.844*** 0.321*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0634) (0.0300) (0.0234) 
Republican Congressman -0.00251 0.0617*** -0.0290*** -0.0301*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00332) (0.00175) (0.00140) 
2004 Cycle -0.0250*** 0.0167*** 0.00450* 0.00377* 
 (0.00477) (0.00549) (0.00247) (0.00209) 
2006 Cycle -0.0474*** 0.0269*** 0.0128*** 0.00773*** 
 (0.00489) (0.00584) (0.00272) (0.00235) 
2008 Cycle -0.0684*** 0.0294*** 0.0254*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00534) (0.00260) (0.00209) 
2010 Cycle -0.105*** 0.0366*** 0.0408*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.00412) (0.00523) (0.00253) (0.00222) 
Constant 0.213*** 0.651*** 0.0846*** 0.0520*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00530) (0.00229) (0.00210) 
     
Observations 726,423 726,423 726,423 726,423 
R-squared 0.012 0.007 0.005 0.007 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 14.     Magnitude Determination Estimates 
VARIABLES 
Number Affected  
Due to Violation 
  
Coal/Total Contributions -1.839*** 
 (0.659) 
Republican Congressman -0.222*** 
 (0.0348) 
2004 Cycle 0.0243 
 (0.0813) 
2006 Cycle 0.0193 
 (0.0910) 
2008 Cycle 0.350*** 
 (0.0851) 
2010 Cycle 0.313*** 
 (0.0873) 
Constant 1.985*** 
 (0.105) 
  
Observations 742,259 
R-squared 0.001 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 15.     Contestation Estimates 
VARIABLES Change in Penalty 
  
Coal/Total Contributions 5,862*** 
 (753.8) 
Republican Congressman 212.1*** 
 (40.13) 
2004 Cycle 129.8 
 (104.4) 
2006 Cycle 99.73 
 (86.30) 
2008 Cycle -503.3*** 
 (82.63) 
2010 Cycle 129.9* 
 (72.74) 
Constant -859.0*** 
 (88.78) 
  
Observations 121,491 
R-squared 0.008 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
